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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
No. 860025 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The additional issue presented for review by Respon-
dent's Cross-Appeal is: Did plaintiff fail to meet her burden of 
proof and are the findings of the trial court, that no common law 
marriage existed between the parties, adequately supported by 
competent evidence in the record. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Brief is submitted in reply to the answering brief 
of Miss Hough and in answer to the issue of a common-law marriage 
raised by Miss Hough in her Cross-Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Miss Hough and Dr. Colley met in August, 1972 while they 
were both students at the University of Texas in Galveston. Miss 
Hough was looking for a roommate to share expenses in a house she 
wanted to rent and asked Dr. Colley if he would be interested; he 
responded that he would and they moved into the house together. 
The initial arrangement was that the parties would share 
expenses. T. Vol. I, p. 5-6, R. 1169-1170. 
Each of the parties continued to lead their own separate 
lives and to date other people. T. Vol. I, p. 7, Vol. II, p. 81, 
R. 1171, 1471. Soon, however, the relationship developed into 
one that was "very heated," T. Vol. I, p. 8, R. 1172, and the 
parties commenced having sexual relations with each other. T. 
Vol. I, p. 7, 73-74, R. 1171, 1237-1238. In the spring of 1973, 
Miss Hough was visited, in Galveston, by her brother, Steven and 
her sister, Maureen, who were both aware that the plaintiff and 
the defendant were unmarried but living together. T. Vol. II, p. 
38, R. 1428; S. Hough Depo. p. 6. 
In "February or March," according to Miss Hough, the 
parties met with Dr. Robert Creason, a professor of psychology at 
the University of Texas in Galveston. Plaintiff claimed that the 
Creason meeting occurred because she and Dr. Colley wanted to 
talk about "redefining their relationship." T. Vol. I, p. 77-78, 
R. 1241-1242. Dr* Colley testified, however, that the meeting 
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was to discuss the fact that the parties were living together but 
were not married. T. Vol. II, p. 86-87, R. 1476-1477. In any 
event, in April, 1973 Miss Hough took Dr. Colley home to visit 
her parents in Fort Worth, Texas. Prior to that time, Miss Hough 
wrote her parents a letter informing them that she was coming 
home with Ma surprise", "Joel Colley - my roommate." Ex. 1, 
reproduced infra at Al to A2. Miss Hough's parents were not 
pleased with the relationship between the parties and required 
that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley occupy separate bedrooms while in 
their home. T. Vol. II, p. 38-39, 90, R. 1428-1429, 1480; Depo. 
S. Hough p. 35. In the spring of 1973, Dr. Colley completed his 
medical training at the University of Texas and began an intern-
ship in Philadelphia. Miss Hough originally went to Indianapolis 
but later that year, after she had also graduated, joined Dr. 
Colley in Pennsylvania. While in Texas, Miss Hough continued to 
use the name of Robin Hough exclusively. It appeared on her 
social security card, and on her Texas driver's license. In 
addition, she graduated from the University of Texas as "Robin 
Hough." T. Vol. I, p. 79, R. 1243. While in Philadelphia Dr. 
Colley worked at a hospital and Miss Hough obtained employment as 
an occupational therapist under the name of Robin Hough and had 
both a personal bank account and a joint account with Dr. Colley 
as Robin Hough, signed all of the checks as Robin Hough and 
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traveled as Robin Hough on the AmTrak. T. Vol. I, p. 80-84, llly 
R. 1244-1248, 1275, Ex. 41-46. 
In "June or July" of 1974, the parties moved to Hot 
Springs, Montana. Miss Hough was employed as an occupational 
therapist under the name of Robin Hough. In addition, the 
parties had a joint checking account under the name of Robin 
Hough and Joel Colley. Miss Hough also had a separate account 
under the name of Robin Hough and she signed checks on both of 
those accounts as Robin Hough. Also while in Montana, Miss Hough 
joined the American Occupational Therapy Association using the 
name of Robin Hough. T. Vol. I, p. 112-114, R. 1276-1278, Ex. 
47-52. Dr. Colley was employed as a physician in the community 
of Hot Springs. 
On December 15, 1974, the parties left Hot Springs and 
traveled to Texarkana, Arkansas. While traveling, they stopped 
to see Miss Hough's grandmother in Guymon, Oklahoma. T. Vol. I, 
p. 28, R. 1192. While there, Miss Hough's grandmother "burst 
into tears" and asked why Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were living 
in sin. Together they explained to her that even though she may 
not understand, that was the way they wanted it at that time. 
They then left because they were causing Miss Hough's grandmother 
a great deal of hurt and pain. T. Vol. II, p. 109-110, R. 
1499-1500. While the parties resided in Arkansas, Miss Hough 
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maintained a bank account under the name of Robin Hough and, 
without exception, continued to use her maiden name. T. Vol. I. 
p. 115, R. 1279. 
In May, 1975, Miss Hough applied for a United States 
Passport. Ex. 55, reproduced infra at A3 to A5. Item E on the 
passport application required her to check one of two boxes, "I 
was never married" or "I was last married on." Miss Hough 
checked the box "I was never married." T. Vol. I, p. 119, R. 
1283. 
In the mid-part of 1975, the parties moved to Denver, 
Colorado. While in Colorado, Miss Hough continued to use the 
name of Hough exclusively. She maintained a bank account under 
the name of Robin Hough, had a joint account with Dr. Colley 
using the name of Hough, was known in the American Occupational 
Therapist Association as Robin Hough, conducted business under 
the name of Robin Hough, and charged gasoline and other purchases 
as Robin Hough. T. Vol. I, p. 116-119, R. 1280-1283, Ex. 57-69. 
Throughout their relationship, Miss Hough and Dr. Colley 
discussed getting married. T. Vol. II, p. 97, R. 1487. Although 
Miss Hough was originally pressing for the ceremony, R. 794, she 
later rebuffed Dr. Colley's request that they marry. T. Vol. II, 
p. 114, R. 1504. 
In December, 1975, Dr. Colley moved to Salt Lake City. 
Miss Hough joined him in January, 1976. On October 30, 1981, the 
parties separated. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Miss Hough failed miserably to meet her burden of proof 
and convince the trial court that there had been a common law 
marriage. She failed to prove that there was an agreement bet-
ween the parties that they would marry and further failed to 
prove that the reputation of the parties in the communities in 
which they lived was that of husband and wife. 
Miss Hough is vague concerning when and where she con-
tends she married Dr. Colley and, in fact, alleged, just prior to 
trial, that she had married him by common law in four different 
states, a most absurd contention. 
Miss Hough used her maiden name throughout the relation-
ship, introduced Dr. Colley to her parents as her "roommate", or 
referred to him as someone she was "living with." In addition, 
she freely admitted that she was not married to him and swore, 
under oath, that she had never been married. The credible evi-
dence showed, overhwelmingly, that there had not been a marriage 
between the parties; thus, the findings of the trial court in 
that regard must be upheld. 
The court erred, however, in finding that there was a 
partnership between the parties. As with the purported marriage, 
Miss Hough failed to state where and when the partnership was 
formed and what business it was supposedly conducting. The fact 
that two people co-habitat together does not create a partner-
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ship? howeverf if there was a partnership its obligations must be 
repaid before there is a distribution to the parties. The trial 
court's refusal to order the debts repaid and to compensate Dr. 
Colley for the funds infused into the properties after Miss Hough 
walked out, is clear error. 
I 
PLAINTIFF1S STATEMENT OF "FACTS" IS GROSSLY 
DISTORTED AND MISLEADING TO THE COURT 
In her zeal to advocate her position, Miss Hough has 
distorted the facts and in the process has grossly misrepresented 
to this Court what really happened. While a review of the record 
will reveal plaintiff's biased version of the "facts," defendant 
feels compelled to present illustrative, but not exhaustive, 
examples of plaintiff's actions. 
Plaintiff's first slanted "fact" relates to the meeting 
with Dr. Robert Creason. Resp. Br., p. 4-5. Miss Hough states 
that the parties purportedly told Dr. Creason that they had "a 
committed relationship" and a marriage "relationship" that would 
continue. Dr. Colley's testimony was quite different from Miss 
Hough's. He stated that the Creason meeting dealt with the fact 
that the parties were not married and that they wished to discuss 
the ramifications of their decision to live together without mar-
riage. T. Vol. II, p. 86-87, R. 1476-1477. For Miss Hough, 
therefore, to state as a "fact" only her version of that meeting 
is improper. 
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Miss Hough next cites, as a "fact," her version of the 
meeting with her parents in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1973. Miss 
Hough cleverly weaves into her story, certain words that are not 
found in the record. For instance, Miss Hough states that her 
parents were distressed because the parties had not participated 
in a "ceremonial marriage." Resp. Br. p. 5. Actually, plaintiff 
testified as follows: "My mom, in particular, had extreme 
concern about the statement." T. Vol. I, p. 12, R. 1176. There 
is absolutely no reference to a "ceremonial marriage" in the 
record as cited by plaintiff, although it is true that Miss 
Hough's parents were deeply distressed about the relationship of 
the parties. T. Vol. II, p. 39, R. 1429. Dr. Colley testified 
that at the meeting in Fort Worth, Miss Hough explained to her 
parents that the parties were living together under the same roof 
and having sex and that they did not want to be married. T. Vol. 
II, p. 89, R. 1479. In response thereto, Miss Hough's parents 
refused to allow the parties to occupy the same bedroom while in 
their home. T. Vol. II, p. 90, R. 1480. 
Although Dr. Colley specifically denied the various 
statements attributed to him by plaintiff, T. Vol. II, p. 80, R. 
1479, she now cites them as "facts". 
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that the parties combined 
furniture and belongings and were shipped to Philadelphia. 
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Resp. Br. p. 5. Dr. Colley denied that. T. Vol. II, p. 93, 292, 
R. 1483, 1679. 
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that Dr. Colley gave her 
"a set of wedding rings that had belonged to his mother." Resp. 
Br. p. 6. Not only did Dr. Colley deny that he had ever given 
any rings to Miss Hough, T. Vol. II, p. 191, R. 1581, Miss Hough, 
herself, originally stated that she had not received any wedding 
rings. On August 10, 1983, Miss Hough testified at her 
deposition as follows: 
Q. Did Dr. Colley give you a wedding ring? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. Did you ever ask him for one? 
A. We had talked about a ring and had 
decided the fact that I wasnft too wild 
about diamonds, I would rather have a 
colored stone and at one time Joel had 
investigated about buying an emerald and 
instead gave me a couple of opals, but I 
never had them mounted into a ring. T. 
Vol. I, p. 77, R. 1467. 
In addition, the photograph introduced by Miss Hough, as 
Ex. 2, which photograph is now "mysteriously" missing from the 
Clerk's Evidence Room, shows Miss Hough's left hand; she is not 
wearing a wedding ring. For the plaintiff to boldly state, 
therefore, that she received a wedding ring from the defendant as 
a "fact" of this case is clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence. 
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Miss Hough states as a "fact" that there was a discus-
sion with the accountant in Philadelphia wherein Dr. Colley 
stated that they were "common law married." Resp. Br, p. 7. Dr. 
Colley denied any such discussion but testified, rather, that the 
parties, knowing that they were not married, decided to file a 
joint return because they did not want to give the government any 
more money than was absolutely necessary. T. Vol. II, p. 
100-101, R. 1490-1491. 
Miss Hough states several times in her brief that the 
parties filed joint returns "representing under penalty of per-
jury" that they were married. That is totally false. Plaintiff 
did not produce any of the income tax returns of the parties 
during the years in question. The issue of the contents of the 
returns and whether they were signed under penalty of perjury was 
specifically presented to the trial court and the trial court 
ruled that there was no evidence that any such statement appeared 
on the returns. T. Vol. II, p. 294-295, R. 1681-1682. Thus, the 
precise "fact" now being asserted by Miss Hough is not only 
unsupported by the evidence, it was specifically rejected by the 
trial court. In addition, Dr. Colley testified repeatedly that 
the joint returns were filed because the parties felt entitled to 
the extra deductions because they were living together and, since 
there was no provision for people who were co-habitating to file 
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jointly, in order to file a joint return, the joint return box 
had to be checked. T. Vol. II, p. 100-101, R. 1489-1490. 
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that while in Montana, Dr. 
Colley stated to her brother, Steven, that they had a common law 
marriage and therefore could file a joint tax return with no 
problems. Resp. Br. p. 7. Dr. Colley denied ever making such a 
statement. Such a recitation of "fact" ignores plaintiff's own 
testimony and the testimony of her brother, Steven. He denied 
any such statement was made to him in Montana. He testified that 
the first time that he learned that the parties were filing a 
joint return was in Arkansas, Depo. S. Hough, p. 11, 62, long 
after the parties had left Montana. In addition, plaintiff, her-
self, testified that the tax return for 1974 was filed around 
April 15, 1975, T. Vol. I, p. 153, R. 1317, approximately four 
(4) months after the parties had moved from Montana. Miss 
Hough's brother testified that he was only in Montana during 
August and September, 1974, therefore, it is highly unlikely that 
there would have been any discussion about filing a joint tax 
return in Montana, some seven (7) months before it was due. 
Ignoring all of that, however, and in spite of the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, plaintiff recites the purported 
conversation as "fact". 
Miss Hough's statement that Dr. Colley introduced her at 
a reception in Montana as his wife, ignores not only the 
testimony of Dr. Colley, T. Vol. II, p. 103, R. 1493, but also 
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that of two Hot Springs residents who testified to the contrary. 
Depos. Roosma and Heinselman. Apparently undeterred by the 
voluminous evidence refuting her contention, plaintiff persists 
in presenting her biased version of what transpired as a "fact." 
Miss Hough states that since Dr. Colley wanted to move, 
the parties left Montana and lived in Texas "again." Resp. Br. 
p. 8. In actual fact, according to plaintiff's own testimony, 
the move was necessitated by the closure of the hospital in 
Montana. T. Vol. I, p. 28, R. 1192. More important, however, is 
the fact that the parties did not live in Texas but lived in 
Arkansas, a fact that was acknowledged by Miss Hough's own 
counsel. T. Vol. I, p. 29, R. 1193. 
Since Texas is a common law state, but Arkansas is not, 
the distinction between living in Texas or living in Arkansas is 
significant, and Miss Hough's attempt to mislead this Court into 
believing that the parties "lived in Texas again" can only be 
characterized as a feeble try to bolster her claim of a common 
law marriage. 
Plaintiff states that "after only a few months" Dr. 
Colley became disenchanted with the residency program in 
Colorado. Resp. Br. p. 8. Actually, the plaintiff, herself, 
testified that the residency training program "kind of fell apart 
while we were there." T. Vol. I, p. 39, R. 1203. Rather than 
being disenchanted, Dr. Colley testified that the Head of the 
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Department was leaving and taking everybody with him and that Dr. 
Colley did not want to go to Ann Arbor. T. Vol. II, p. 114, R. 
1504. 
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that she evaluated and 
located "numerous properties" that the parties purchased. Resp. 
Br. p. 9. In actual fact, the plaintiff testified that some of 
the properties in Utah were located by other real estate agents 
and some were located by her. All properties outside Utah were 
located by others. T. Vol. I, p. 52f R. 1216. Miss Hough further 
acknowledged that she was not sure exactly what properties she 
had located. T. Vol. I, p. 68, R. 1232. 
Plaintiff states that Dr. Colley's pension plan had a 
net asset value of approximately $100,000, at the time of separa-
tion and that the value of the pension plan "prior to trial" had 
risen to approximately $300,000. Resp. Br. p. 11. At the time 
of separation, the retirement trust showed a total asset value of 
$184,000. Ex. 29. One hundred four thousand dollars of that 
amount related to the loans to the parties that the trial court 
has refused to have repaid. In addition, $33,500 was for the 
contribution for 1981 to be made in the future by Dr. Colley, 
$20,000 related to land in Park City which the court subsequently 
ordered sold and $10,000 consisted of land in Montana which ulti-
mately became valueless. The maximum value at separation, there-
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fore, was no more than $17,000. The "$300,000" figure for 1983 
is similarly misleading since it also contains the loans, the 
contribution receivable from Dr. Colley, the Montana land and 
$80,000 for the Park City property. In addition, by 1984, the 
value of the gross trust assets had declined $125,000. T. Vol, 
II. p. 25-28, 32-33, R. 1415-1418, 1422-1423. Thus, plaintiff 
attempts to leave this Court with the false impression that the 
retirement trust constitutes an enormous fund of wealth, when in 
reality it has little, if any, value at the present time and any 
future value is dependent upon repayment of the loans, which 
plaintiff has vigorously resisted doing. 
Plaintiff states that the parties "frequently" cele-
brated their anniversary on August 24th, the date that they first 
met. Resp. Br, p. 13. In actual fact, plaintiff, testified 
that, rather than celebrating that date frequently, it was not 
celebrated consistently throughout their relationship. She 
stated, "We would celebrate it one year and the next we would 
forget, and then celebrate it and then forget." T. Vol. I, p. 
110, R. 1274. 
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that Dr. Colley "admitted" 
that he had received $100,000 in tax benefits since the parties 
separated. Dr. Colley^ testimony was hardy the admission 
claimed by plaintiff. He actually testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Dart) You've had the benefits of 
$100,000 in write-offs on these investments since 
your separation from Robin on money you earned in 
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1982, that you didn't share with Robin? 
A, I don't - - I'll have to think about that. 
Doesn't show capital expenditures, it also doesn't 
show future tax obligations; so that is a very 
misleading way to present this. T. Vol. II, p. 
277-278, R. 1665-1666. 
Perhaps the most egregious misrepresentation to this 
Court appears on page 7 of Miss Hough's brief where, apparently 
in a deliberate attempt to mislead this Court, she states that 
the parties acguired a house in Hot Springs, Montana. Plaintiff 
further produced, at A33 through A40, the documents relating to 
that purchase. Miss Hough failed to point out, however, that the 
property in question was purchased in 1976, while the parties 
were residing in Utah, almost two years after they had left 
Montana. The purchase, therefore, could have no relevance on the 
issue of whether or not the parties held themselves out, while in 
Montana, as being married; nevertheless, in support of her con-
tention that there was a common law marriage, Miss Hough 
deviously refers the Court, on page 37 of her brief, to the prop-
erty purchase. Plaintiff's failure to forthrightly inform this 
Court that the property was not actually purchased while the 
parties lived in Montana comes dangerously close to constituting 
fraud upon this Court. 
Miss Hough has carefully selected those items of testi-
mony which support her version of what transpired and has con-
veniently ignored any testimony or exhibits to the contrary. In 
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an attempt to advocate her cause, plaintiff has grossly mislead 
this Court. Such conduct is most opprobrious. 
II 
THERE WAS NO COMMON LAW MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Plaintiff cleverly argues that the trial court refused 
to recognize the common law marriage between the parties. 
Actually the court held that n£ common law marriage occurred. 
The court's ruling is correct. 
A. Since the issue of the alleged marriage is factual, 
the trial court's findings must be upheld. The issue of the 
existence or non-existence of a common law marriage between the 
parties presents a guestion of fact. The scope of review on 
appeal is different, therefore, then for eguitable matters. 
Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975). 
The plaintiff failed to persuade the court that a common 
law marriage had occurred. The trial court found that it had 
not; therefore, that factual determination should not be upset on 
appeal unless there is no substantial record evidence to support 
it. Ercanbrack v. Crandall-Walker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1976). Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); 
B. Common law marriages are founded upon the mutual 
consent of the parties to be married and a public showing of 
marriage thereafter. The main thrust of plaintiff's claim of a 
common law marriage was, apparently, centered around the rela-
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tionship of the parties in Galvestonf Texas. Miss Hough origi-
nally claimed that she married defendant on August 24, 1972, JR^  
2^ Realizing that such a claim was absurd since that was the day 
the parties first met, she amended her claim to sometime in 
"August, 1972." R. 19. She abandoned that position at the time 
of trial, however, and claimed that she had been married by 
common law in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana and Colorado. R. 
835-836. She has, however, never stated precisely where and when 
she contends that the marriage, or marriages, took place. 
Although the requirements for a valid common law marriage vary 
slightly from state to state, among those states that recognize 
common law marriages, all common law states require a clear 
meeting of the minds between the parties and a public holding out 
and reputation of marriage in the community before a valid common 
law marriage can exist. Mere isolated instances in which one 
party may represent that he or she is married are insufficient. 
In addition, co-habitation alone does not create a common law 
marriage. The key element is consent, deliberately given with 
the intention that a marriage result therefrom. Absent such 
consent there can be no common law marriage; therefore, Miss 
Hough's failure to pinpoint the date, time and place of marriage 
clearly shows that there was no marriage consent and, hence, no 
marriage. 
What woman, other than Miss Hough, does not know 
precisely when and where she was married? 
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1. Utah Law. Utah does not recognize a common 
law marriage. Johnson v. Johnson, 116 Utah 27f 207 P.2d 1036 
(1949). A common law marriage can not be consummated in Utahf it 
must be solemnized as required by statute. In re Vetas' Estate, 
110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946). The Vetas case implies, 
however, that Utah will recognize a common law marriage by 
residents of other states which is valid in the other state. 
Such, however, was not the case here. 
2. Texas Law. Three elements are necessary in 
order to create a common law marriage in the state of Texas: 
(a) The parties must agree to be 
married, and 
(b) After the agreement, they must live 
together in the state of Texas as 
husband and wife, and 
(c) They must hold themselves out to the 
public as husband and wife. 
Section 1.91 Vernon's Texas Code Annotated; Walter v. 
Walter, 433 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). 
In order to have a common law marriage in Texas there 
must be a mutual agreement of marriage between the parties. In 
Gary v. Gary, 490 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) the Court 
said, in discussing the elements of a common law marriage: 
It is particularly essential that the 
parties mutually agree that they would 
then and thenceforth be husband and wife 
and that the following co-habitation be 
on the faith of this agreement and 
promise. 
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The agreement to become husband and wife must be an 
agreement to do so presently and not in the future. Id. 
Co-habitation alone does not create a common law marriage. There 
must also be a specific agreement to be married. Present consent 
and agreement to be married is the jist of a common law marriage 
and it is not sufficient to agree on present co-habitation and 
future marriage. The Gary Court went on to state: 
We have found no case nor have we been 
directed to any which allowed the infer-
ence of an agreement to be made solely on 
the basis of proven co-habitation. . . 
Agreement is fundamental and co-habita-
tion is only one element of a common law 
marriage which will not suffice in it-
self. The agreement necessary for a 
common law marriage must be specific from 
both sides. . . 
There must be a meeting of the minds or 
there is no contract (referring to a 
marriage contract). Id. 
In Texasf the trier of fact must specifically find that 
an agreement to be husband and wife existed in that state, that 
the parties intended that their agreement create a marriage and 
that it was to be an immediate and permanent relationship. In re 
Estate of Bivians, 652 P.2d 744 (N.M. App. 1982) (applying Texas 
law). In the instant case, the trial court specifically found 
that there was no such agreement; therefore, there could be no 
marriage. 
-19-
In order to establish a valid common law marriage in 
Texas, the parties must publicly hold themselves out as husband 
and wife. Secrecyf it has been held, is inconsistent and 
irreconcilable with the requirement of a public holding out that 
the couple is living together as husband and wife. Ex parte 
Threet, 333 S.W.2d 361 (Texas 1960). In Walter v. Walter, supray 
the Court stated: 
The public and open holding out that the 
two are man and wife are as essential to 
a valid common law marriage as the agree-
ment itself, without these elements there 
is no common law marriage. 
Under Texas law there must be an uncontroverted reputa-
tion in the community in which the parties live in order to 
establish a common law marriage. As the Court stated in Walter 
v. Walter, supra: 
Repute must be general extending to the 
friends and relatives of both parties 
with whom their daily lives are spent, 
and such repute must not be divided, 
(emphasis added). 
Under ordinary circumstances, the agreement, which is 
the essential element of a common law marriage, may be implied if 
it is proved that the parties lived together as husband and wife 
and held themselves out to the public as husband and wife. Gary 
v. Gary, supra. Where, however, the initial relationship between 
the parties is illicit in its origin, as it was here, the law 
raises from it no presumption of marriage. Walter v. Walter, 
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supra* Under Texas law where the original relationship between 
the parties is illicit, there is an inference that that relation-
ship continues. In re Estate of Biviansy supra. As the Bivians 
Court observed, "The law presumes that a status, relation or 
intent proved to exist continues as along as usual with things of 
that nature. This applies to illicit relationships." Further, 
the court stated, "For an illicit relationship to become trans-
mitted into a valid common law marriage, the evidence must show 
actual matrimony by unilateral consent of each of the parties 
within the state authorizing common law marriages." Id. 
Under Texas law, claims of a common law marriage are 
closely scrutinized by the Courts. Strict requirements 
necessitating proof of each of the elements of such a marriage 
must be established before the Courts will lend judicial sanction 
to any assertions that a marriage relationship exists. In re 
Estate of Bivians, supra; Gary v. Gary, supra. The evidence 
presented by plaintiff in this case must, therefore, exclude the 
inference that the original illicit relationship between herself 
and the defendant continued and it must show the formulation in 
Texas of a new matrimonial intent by each of the parties. In re 
Estate of Bivians, supra. It did not. 
3. Pennsylvania Law. As in Texas, the basis of a 
common law marriage in Pennsylvania is an agreement between the 
parties to presently become husband and wife followed by co-
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habitation and a general reputation in the community of being 
married. Seef In re Lattanzi Appeal, 35 Beaver 187 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pleas 1976). Pennsylvania law requires that there must be an 
agreement entered into in that state by uttering words in the 
present tense with an intent to establish a marital relationship. 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 398 A.2d 978 (Pa. 1979); In re Lattanzi 
Appeal, supra. A present intent to enter into a common law 
marriage is the critical element in proving such a marriage. 
Bowden v. Workman's Comp. App. Bd., 376 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Cmwlth., 
1977); The Estate of Gavula, 417 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1980). The 
statement of the Court in Hertz v. Hertz, 23 D&C 3d 55 (Pa. Ct. 
Comm. Pleas 1981) is particularly applicable in this case. 
Since people live together without in-
tending to marryf there must be proof of 
an agreement to enter into the relation-
ship in order to establish that the 
parties are married. 
Under the law of Pennsylvania, a presumption of marriage 
based upon co-habitation and reputation will not arise where the 
parties lived together unmarried up to the time of the alleged 
agreement to create a common law relationship. In re Cummings1 
Estate, 479 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. 1984). Where a relationship 
between a man and a woman is illicit and meretricious in its 
inception, it is presumed to so continue during the co-habitation 
of the parties. In re Oravetz Estate, 55 Erie 94 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pleas 1972). 
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In order to prove a common law marriage in Pennsylvania, 
reputation of marriage is reguired, i.e., the parties must be 
regarded as married by their friends and neighbors* In re 
Craddock's Case, 37 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. 1941) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law). In In re Stevens' Estate, 116 A. 162 (Pa. 1922), the 
Court observed that the conduct of the parties must be such that 
almost anyone acguainted with them would naturally infer that 
they were married to each other. In that case the defendant pro-
vided plaintiff with a home approximately five miles away from 
where he lived. The parties were known as husband and wife in 
the area of the home, but defendant was known as single in the 
area where he resided. The Court concluded that plaintiff had 
failed to establish that the reputation of the parties was that 
of being married among their friends and associates. 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132 (1866), 
the Court there stated that reputation must be proved by the 
neighbors and acguaintances and that reputation consists of 
"speech of the people who have the opportunity to know the par-
ties." Of more recent vintage is the case of Van Brakle v. 
Lanauze, 438 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. 1981), where the Court noted 
that the reputation (for marriage) must be broad and general. In 
the case of In re Manfredi's Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 159 A.2d 697 
(1960), the Court observed that the mere fact that the parties 
were known to a few people as man and wife is not sufficient to 
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establish a common law marriage. The Court stated that a 
reputation for such purpose must be general and not confined to a 
few persons in the immediate neighborhood, since the relationship 
may be established merely for the purpose of deceiving others. 
Admissions to a few individuals that a person is one's 
"wife" or "husband" are insufficient to prove a common law mar-
riage in Pennsylvania. Levy's Estate, 161 A. 740 (1932); Estate 
of Gavula, supra. In factf even if there is a general holding 
out as husband and wife there is no common law marriage absent a 
present intention to be married. Bowden v. Workman's Comp. App. 
Bd., supra. 
In Melon v. Richardson, 466 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972) the 
Court refused to find a valid Pennsylvania common law marriage 
even though the couple lived together for seven (7) yearsf had 
operated a business jointly, had filed joint tax returns and had 
owned property jointly. The Court found that there were no 
"words in the present tense uttered with a view and for the 
purpose of establishing the relation of husband and wife;" 
therefore, there was no common law marriage. 
4. Montana Law. In Montana the requirements of a 
common law marriage are established by statute. Section 48-101, 
R. C. M. (1974) provides: 
Marriage is a personal relation arising 
out of a civil contract, to which the 
consent of parties capable of making it 
is necessary. Consent alone will not 
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constitute marriage; it must be followed 
by a solemnization of the marital rela-
tion, or by mutual and public assumption 
of the marital relation. 
In Montana, therefore, a common law marriage requires 
not only the consent of both parties but, in addition, there must 
be a mutual and public assumption of the marital relation. In 
Miller v. Townsend Lumber Company, 448 P.2d 148 (Mont. 1968), the 
Court stated that the requirements for a valid common law 
marriage in Montana are: 
1. A mutual consent of the parties; 
2. Assumption of the marriage relation-
ship as of a time certain; 
3. Co-habitation; and 
4. Repute. 
Regarding repute, the Miller Court stated: 
"When we speak of repute we mean reputation, being the character 
and status commonly ascribed to one's actions by the public." 
Absent a public assumption of the marriage relation there can be 
no common law marriage in Montana. State v. Newman, 213 P.805 
(Mont. 1923). 
In order to establish a common law marriage in Montana 
there must be a specific agreement and it must take place immedi-
ately, it can not be created piecemeal, it either comes instantly 
into being or it does not come at all. Matter of the Estate of 
Peltomaa, 630 P.2d 215 (Mont. 1981). 
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Co-habitation alone is insufficient to create a common 
law marriage. In re Estate of Slavens, 509 P.2d 293 (Mont. 
1973)? Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., supra; In re Miller v. 
Houston's Estate, 139 P. 458 (Mont. 1914)* In the case of Miller 
v. Sutherland, 309 P.2d 322 (Mont. 1957), the Court described the 
consent that is required under Montana law to create a common law 
marriage. There the Court stated: 
Consent. . . must always be given with 
such an intent on the part of each of the 
parties that marriage can not be said to 
steal upon them unawares. One can not 
become married unwittingly or accidental-
ly. The consent required by our 
statutes, as well as the statutes of 
every state, and by the common law, must 
be seriously given with the deliberate 
intention that marriage result presently 
therefrom. There must be an agreement 
between the parties that they will hold 
towards each other the relation of hus-
band and wife, with all the responsibili-
ties and duties which the law attaches to 
such relation, otherwise there can be no 
lawful marriage. . . The absence of such 
consent renders the relations of the 
parties meretricious. 
In Miller v. Sutherland, supra, the Court defined the 
meaning of a mutual and public assumption of the marital rela-
tion, as a "course of conduct on the part of both man and wife 
towards each other and toward the world as that people generally 
would take them to be married." 
As in Pennsylvania and Texas, the law of Montana pre-
sumes that an illicit relationship continues, and, therefore, 
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there is no presumption of a common law marriage where the 
initial relationship of the parties is meretricious. See Stevens 
v. Woodman of the World, 71 P.2d 898 (Mont. 1937). 
In Montana, as in all other states, mere isolated 
instances in which one represents his or herself as married are 
insufficient to establish a common law marriage in the absence of 
a specific agreement to be married. In re Estate of Peltomaa, 
supra. 
5. Arkansas Law. There is no common law marriage 
in Arkansas. Spicer v. Spicer, 397 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1965). 
6. Colorado Law. An agreement to marry entered 
into in Colorado is fundamental to the creation of a common law 
marriage. Graham v. Graham, 274 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1954). A common 
law marriage in Colorado must be established by proof of consent, 
co-habitation and reputation. Graham v. Graham, supra. In cases 
where the contract or agreement is denied and can not be shown, 
its existence may be proven by, and presumed from, evidence of 
co-habitation as husband and wife and general repute. Id. 
General repute means the understanding among the neighbors and 
acquaintances with whom the parties associate in their daily life 
that they are living together as husband and wife and not in 
meretricious intercourse. Id^ . , Taylor v. Taylor, 50 P. 1049 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1897). In its application to the issue of 
marriage, repute is more than mere hearsay. It involves and is 
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made up of social conduct and recognition giving character to an 
admitted and unconcealed co-habitation. Taylor v. Taylor, supra. 
It is necessary that there be evidence of both co-habitation and 
reputation before a marriage can be presumed. Graham v. Graham, 
supra. Proof of one alone is not sufficient. Taylor v. Taylor, 
supra. Where an initial relationship begins as meretricious, the 
party must show by competent evidence that the relationship has 
changed. Pickett v. Pickett, 161 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1945). 
C. An Isolated reference to someone as a spouse does 
not create a marriage. The case law is clear that mere isolated 
references to one or the other party as a spouse do not consti-
tute the required holding out to the community and are, there-
fore, insufficient to establish a common law marriage. *Gary v. 
Gary, supra; Ex parte Threet, supra. As the Bivians Court 
declared: 
An occasional holding out of marriage or 
mere sexual relationship in a state 
authorizing common law marriage does not 
result in a formulation of a bona fide 
marriage. 
In Mellon v. Richardson, supra, the Court held that 
filing joint tax returns and owning property jointly did not 
constitute a common law marriage. Similarly, the Courts in 
Estate of Peltomaa, supra, and In re Estate of Bivians, supra, 
found that there was no common law marriage even though the 
parties had filed joint tax returns. Maintaining joint bank 
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accounts is also insufficient to create a common law marriage. 
In re Estate of Biviansy supra. 
In In the Matter of the Estate of McClellan, 541 P.2d 
780 (Mont. 1975), the Court observed that holding oneself out as 
married only when it is of benefit is not sufficient to establish 
a common law marriage. In additionf merely registering at a 
hotel as a married couple does not create a common law marriage. 
Miller v. Sutherland/ supra. In Claveria v. Estate of Claveria, 
597 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), rev'd other grounds, 615 
S.W.2d 164, the execution of a mortgage loan transaction where 
both parties acknowledged themselves to be husband and wife, was 
held to be legally insufficient to establish a common law 
marriage in Texas. The law requires a consistent, broad, general 
reputation of marriage. In re Estate of Bivians, supra; Van 
Brakle v. Lanauze, supra. Absent that, there can not be a common 
law marriage. 
D. There is a public policy against common law mar-
riage. Common law marriages are disfavored by the Courts. As 
the Court in Van Brakle v. Lanauze, supra, observed, "common law 
marriage is a fruitful source of perjury and fraud to be 
tolerated and not encouraged." More recently the Court, in In re 
Estate of Bivians, supra, stated that "the time of liberal 
construction of common law marriages is past" since it "opens the 
door to false pretenses of marriage." 
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E. Miss Hough must prove the existence of the alleged 
common law marriage. Contrary to the erroneous assertion in her 
2 
brief, Miss Hough has the burden of proving the existence of the 
alleged common law marriage. The law in Texas reguires the 
plaintiff to "clearly show" the common law marriage. Gary v. 
Gary, supra. In Pennsylvania, proof of the marriage must be made 
by clear and convincing evidence. In re Estate of Garges, 378 
A.2d 307 (Pa. 1977), In re Estate of Ross, 38 Fay.L.J. 32 (Pa. 
Ct. Comm. Pleas 1975)* In Colorado the standard of proof is 
"clear, consistent, convincing and positive". In re Estate of 
Bivians, supra. Under Montana law the plaintiff must prove her 
case by a preponderance of the evidence, Miller v. Sutherland, 
supra, but Montana law reguires proof not only of the agreement, 
but also proof of the public assumption of the marital relation 
after the agreement. 
In the instant case, Miss Hough not only has the burden 
of proving the existence of the common law marriage but, in 
addition thereto, since the initial relationship of the parties 
3 
was illicit, she must also rebut, by clear and convincing evi-
Miss Hough incorrectly states, at p.3 of her brief, 
that in Colorado the party opposing the marriage must show 
by positive proof that the marriage is invalid. Taylor v. 
Taylor, the case cited by Miss Hough is reproduced infra at 
A6 to A7. Dr. Colley will leave it to the reader to deter-
mine whether that case stands for what Miss Hough claims. 
Plaintiff freely admitted that the parties were having 
sexual relations together prior to any purported marriage. 
T. Vol. I, p. 7, 73-74, R. 1171, 1237-1238. 
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dence, the presumption that the illicit relationship continued 
during the co-habitation of the parties. See, e.g., Walter v. 
Walter, supra; In re Estate of Bivians, supra; In re Cummings' 
Estate, supra; Stevens v. Woodman of the World, supra; Pickett v. 
Pickett, supra. Thus, Miss Hough must not only carry her normal 
burden of proof, she must also overcome the presumption that, 
based upon the illicit nature of the relationship between the 
parties, no common law marriage occurred. Defendant submits that 
plaintiff wholly failed to do either. 
F. The evidence adduced by plaintiff was clearly insuf-
ficient to show that a common law marriage had occurred. Plain 
tiff failed to produce any credible evidence relating to her 
contention that "somewhere" a common law marriage had occurred 
between the parties. 
1. Plaintiff's evidence regarding an agreement to 
be married in Texas can not be believed. On December 15, 1983, 
Miss Hough, in response to Defendant's Interrogatory to "List by 
name, address and telephone number each and every person known to 
plaintiff to have knowledge of any discoverable matter that is 
relevant to the issues set forth in plaintiff's complaint" named 
some fifty-eight (58) people scattered throughout the world. 
Significantly missing was any reference to Dr. Robert Creason. 
Plaintiff named people throughout the United States 
as well as Mexico and Australia. 
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R. 137-144. At her deposition on May 16f 1984, plaintiff was 
asked to give the names of anyone in the state of Texas that she 
and defendant represented themselves to as being married during 
1972 or 1973. Plaintiff responded that she could name no one. 
T. Vol. I, p. 200f R. 1364. On January 24, 1985, in opposition 
to Dr. Colley's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue 
of a common law marriage, Miss Hough filed an affidavit wherein 
she mentioned Dr. Creason for the first time. Significantlyf 
Miss Hough did not contend that there had been a marriagef 
rather, she stated that the parties had "entered into a lifetime 
commitment to one another, which commitment and relationship 
contained all the characteristics and elements of a marriage." 
R. 793. (emphasis added). At the time of trial, however, 
plaintiff again modified her testimony andf apparently in an 
attempt to salvage her claim of marriage, testified that the 
parties told Dr. Creason that they were going to make a 
"committed relationship" and form a "marriage relationship." T. 
Vol. I, p. 9-10y R. 1174-1175. Plaintiff's choice of words, 
however, would not, even if believed, be sufficient to create a 
marriage since they did not express a present intent to then and 
there be married to each other as man and wife. See Gary v* 
Gary, supra; In re Estate of Bivians, supra. Defendant denied 
that such statements were made and testified that the meeting 
with Dr. Creason was to discuss the ramifications of the parties 
•32-
living together in a non-marital relationship. T. Vol. II, p. 
86, R. 1476. 
In addition to the fact that plaintiff "forgot" about 
the meeting with Dr. Creason when she filed her complaint, ans-
wered Defendant's Interrogatories and had her deposition taken 
and, in fact, forgot about the meeting until right before trial, 
the letter written by plaintiff to her parents to explain her 
relationship with defendant conclusively established that there 
was no common law marriage. In that letter, Ex. 1, Miss Hough 
referred to the defendant as "her roommate," not as her husband. 
The meeting with Dr. Creason, according to plaintiff, occurred in 
"February or March" of 1973. T. Vol. I, p. 77-78, R. 1241-1242. 
Plaintiff's meeting with her parents, and her letter to them, 
occurred in the later part of April, 1973, at least one month 
after the Creason meeting. Had plaintiff and defendant truly 
entered into a common law marriage, Miss Hough surely would have 
introduced Dr. Colley to her parents as her husband, not as her 
roommate. In addition, had a marriage actually occurred, Miss 
Hough undoubtedly would have known the exact date of the meeting 
rather than an approximation of "February or March." 
Plaintiff places great reliance upon her disputed ver-
sion of the meeting in Fort Worth with her parents. Her version, 
however, is totally inconsistent with her letter designating Dr. 
Colley as her roommate, her subsequent actions, and particularly 
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her affidavit wherein she stated that on April 21, 1973, she told 
her parents that she and Dr. Colley were "planning to live 
together." R. 793-794. (emphasis added). 
Miss Hough attempts to bolster her story through the 
testimony of her sister, Maureen, hardly an impartial witness. 
Maureen testified that both she and her brother, Steven, were 
present when Miss Hough first introduced her roommate, Dr. 
Colley, to her parents. T. Vol. II, p. 43, R. 1433. Steven, 
however, said that he was not there. Depo. S. Hough p. 7. Miss 
Hough could not remember who was there. T. Vol. I. p. 11, R. 
1175. Dr. Colley testified that neither Steven nor Maureen were 
present. T. Vol. II, p. 84, R. 1474. 
Maureen testified that during that meeting, Dr. Colley 
stated that he and Miss Hough were married "in every sense of the 
word," and that he felt committed to Miss Hough "as he would a 
wife," and that he "considered" her his wife. Although plaintiff 
characterizes these statements as an "eloguent articulation" the 
very phrases used by Ms. Rosamond to characterize the discussion 
that purportedly took place, if she was actually present, clearly 
show that there had been no marriage. 
Except for the alleged conversation, Ms. Rosamond could 
remember none of the specifics of what happened. She had no idea 
how Miss Hough introduced Dr. Colley to her parents and had no 
recollection whether or not she was actually present when Miss 
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Hough and Dr. Colley first arrived. T. Vol. II, p. 40y R. 1430. 
She did confirm, however, that her parents were upset with the 
relationship and that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were not allowed 
to sleep in the same bedroom while in the home of Miss Hough's 
parents, T. Vol. II, p. 39, R. 1429, a most curious restriction 
if, as plaintiff contends, the parties were married. 
Dr. Colley submits that it is highly unlikely that 
either of Miss Hough1s siblings were present when she introduced 
her "roommate" to her parents for the first time, an event which 
plaintiff characterized as being "uncomfortable." T. Vol. I, p. 
110, R. 1274. 
In her zeal to support her sister's cause, Ms. Rosamond 
stumbled quite badly. She substantially embellished the contents 
of plaintiff's "roommate" letter and testified that it contained 
references to both a marriage and to travel to Philadelphia. T. 
Vol. II, p. 40, R. 1430. It contained neither. The obviously 
erroneous testimony of Ms. Rosamond, coupled with her lack of 
detail and her relationship to Miss Hough, properly justified the 
trial court's refusal to place much, if any, credence in her 
statements. 
Miss Hough received no support from her brother. He 
testified that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were "living together as 
lovers" in Galveston and that on April 20, 1973, they went to 
Fort Worth to announce "their relationship" to her parents. 
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Depo. S. Hough, p. 6, Mr. Ronald Radcliffe testifiedf without 
contradiction, that he had had conversations with both Steven and 
Maureen subseguent to the alleged Fort Worth meeting and that 
they both admitted to him that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were not 
married. T. Vol. II. p. 239-249, R. 1627-1637. 
Miss Hough testified that the parties celebrated the 
24th of August as their anniversary. She stated, "we used the 
day that we met as an anniversary date." T. Vol. I, p. 110, R. 
1274. Miss Hough further acknowledged that the anniversary was 
not celebrated consistently. In any event it is most curious 
that the parties would celebrate, even on an occasional basis, 
the day that they met as their anniversary if, in fact, the 
parties had actually entered into a subseguent marriage. 
The fact that plaintiff, herself, could not even 
remember the date of the meeting with Dr. Creason and the fact 
that the parties never celebrated that unknown date as their 
wedding anniversary coupled with Miss Hough's characterization of 
the defendant as her "roommate" after the date of the purported 
meeting clearly shows that plaintiff's version of the Creason 
meeting was a recent fabrication and that her claim of marriage 
was not believed by the trial court. 
2. There was no general reputation of marriage 
between plaintiff and defendant in Texas. At the trial plaintiff 
could identify only five (5) people to whom she contended that 
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she had represented that the parties were married. Those indi-
viduals apparently included Dr. Creason, her brother, her sister 
and her parents. With the exception of the disputed statements 
to Dr. Creason, all other statements occurred in Fort Worth, 
Texas, approximately 300 miles from Galveston, the community in 
which the plaintiff and the defendant resided. T. Vol. II, p. 
38, R. 1428. Significantly missing from plaintiff's witnesses, 
however, were her parents and Dr. Creason. In any event, the 
testimony of plaintiff's parents could have no relevance con-
cerning the reputation of plaintiff and defendant in the com-
munity of Galveston. Plaintiff failed to produce any Texas 
friends or acquaintances who could testify about the reputation 
of the parties in Galveston, Texas. There was, therefore, an 
essential element of her case on which there was no credible 
evidence. In re Estate of Bivians, supra; Walter v. Walter, 
supra. 
3. Plaintiff presented no evidence of an agree-
ment to marry in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff presented no evidence 
that there was an agreement to marry entered into in the state of 
Pennsylvania by uttering words in the present tense with an in-
tent to establish a marital relationship. Commonwealth v. 
At her earlier deposition, Miss Hough stated she 
could identify no one. T. Vol. I, p. 200, R. 1364. 
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Sullivan, supra. In fact, Miss Hough's Second Amended Complaint 
is proof in itself that there was no agreement to marry since she 
can not state with any degree of particularity whenf or where the 
g 
alleged marriage took place. In addition, it is highly unlikely 
that, after residing in the state of Texas without the benefit of 
marriage, the parties would enter into a common law marriage in 
the state of Pennsylvania, particularly in view of the attitude 
of her parents toward the relationship and since, in addition, a 
ceremonial wedding had been discussed and rejected. T. Vol. II, 
p. 97, R. 1487. 
4. Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the 
reputation of the plaintiff and the defendant in the state of 
Pennsylvania. Miss Hough presented no evidence upon which the 
court could determine the reputation of the parties in Havertown, 
Pennsylvania, the area in which they lived. Such evidence is 
essential to plaintiff's case. Van Brakle v. Lanauze, supra. 
The only evidence plaintiff introduced were two employment 
applications and testimony relating to the filing of a joint tax 
return. Defendant admitted execution of the employment applica-
It is foolish to believe that, as plaintiff contend-
ed, the parties were married in each of the states of Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Montana and Colorado. R. 835-836. If a mar-
riage did occur, it would be a useless act to repeat that 
marriage in subseguent states. Further, if the parties were 
married, why doesn't the plaintiff know whether they were 
married in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana or Colorado? 
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tions but testified that they were sent to the states of Utah and 
Colorado, in anticipation of marriage to the plaintiff, and that 
they were not shown or distributed to any one in the state of 
Pennsylvania. T. Vol* II, p. 102, R. 1492* The Internal Revenue 
Agent and Miss Hough both testified that the subject tax return 
was filed in the state of Texas, not Pennsylvania. T. Vol. I, p. 
154, Vol. II, p. 6, R. 1318, 1396. At best, those documents 
would constitute mere isolated instances and not meet the re-
quirement of a general reputation and constant holding out of 
marriage. See p. 28-29 of this Brief. Since, however, none of 
those documents were ever circulated in Pennsylvania they could 
not possibly constitute a representation of marriage in that 
state and were not probative of the parties' reputation in 
7 Pennsylvania. Plaintiff further testified that the parties sent 
out a joint Christmas card, but made no statement concerning 
how they represented themselves on that card. T. Vol. I, p. 17, 
R. 1181. Barbara Evans, however, testified that she received 
Christmas cards from plaintiff and defendant and that there was 
nothing on those cards to indicate in any manner that the parties 
were married to each other. T. Vol, II, p. 198-199, R. 
Defendant objected to the exhibits because they were 
never circulated in Pennsylvania, the state in which the 
representation of marriage must be established in order to 
have a common law marriage in that state. T. Vol I, p. 
19-20, R. 1183-1184. 
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1587a-1588. There was also no evidence that any of the cards 
were distributed in Pennsylvania. 
Although the failure of plaintiff to present any 
evidence relating to an agreement to become married in 
Pennsylvania was fatal to her claim of a valid common law 
marriage in that state, the additional failure of plaintiff to 
establish the reputation of the parties in the community was a 
second mortal blow. See, In re Craddocks Casef supra. 
5. Plaintiff failed to show a common law marriage 
in the state of Montana. Plaintiff failed to present any evi-
dence relating to an agreement to marry in the state of Montana. 
As a result, t\ve trial court could not find that there was a 
common law marriage entered into in that state, since, under 
Montana law, there must be a specific agreement to marry and it 
must take place immediately. Matter of the Estate of Peltomaa, 
supra. Plaintiff also failed to produce any competent evidence 
relating to the reputation of the parties in the community. Al-
though plaintiff testified that she was introduced as the defen-
dant's wife at a reception to which "hundreds" of people attend-
ed, the town of Hot Springs, Montana, where plaintiff and 
defendant lived, actually had a total population of only 450 
people. Defendant testified that about 25 people were at the 
reception and that at no time did he introduce plaintiff as his 
wife. In addition, Dr. Colley testified that both Peggy 
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Heinselman and Chloe Roosma, whose testimony is set out herein-
afterf were also at that reception. T. Vol. II, p. 103, R. 1493. 
They clearly refuted plaintiff's claim. 
6. Plaintiff failed to prove a common law mar-
riage in the state of Colorado. Plaintiff's evidence failed to 
establish a common law marriage in the state of Colorado. In 
fact, plaintiff did not ever testify that there had been an 
agreement to marry between plaintiff and defendant entered into 
in that state. As such Miss Hough totally failed to meet her 
burden of proof since an agreement to marry entered into in 
Colorado is fundamental to the creation of a marriage in that 
state. Graham v. Graham, supra. Plaintiff also totally failed 
to present any competent evidence concerning the reputation of 
the parties in Denver. To establish the reputation of the 
parties it was necessary for Miss Hough to show the understanding 
among the neighbors and acquaintances with whom the parties 
associated in their daily lives that they were living together as 
husband and wife. Graham v. Graham, supra. This she failed to 
do. 
Although plaintiff did present a copy of a Deed relating 
to the purchase of ground in the state of Colorado in the name of 
Joel Colley and Robin Hough Colley, husband and wife, the defen-
dant testified, without contradiction, that the document had been 
prepared by someone other than himself, that he had signed the 
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document without reviewing it closely, having rushed to the title 
company from the hospital and then promptly returned to work. 
Dr. Colley further testified that he did not believe that by 
signing the documents he was entering into any kind of a marital 
relationship with Miss Hough. T. Vol. IIy p. 115-116. 
Since there was no evidence of either a new agreement to 
become married in the state of Colorado, or of the reputation of 
the parties among their friends and acquaintances in Colorado, 
there could be no common law marriage in that state. 
G. The evidence presented by defendant overwhelmingly 
supports the finding of the trial court that there was no common 
law marriage. The trial court specifically found that plaintiff 
and defendant "did not agree between themselves to be married and 
did not sufficiently hold themselves out to the public as husband 
and wife to meet the requirements of a common law marriage" and 
that "there was no common law marriage between these parties." 
R. 1078. Dr. Colley produced, at trial, a large quantum of evi-
dence which more than adequately supports the trial court's 
ruling. 
1. Miss Hough consistently used her maiden name 
throughout her relationship with defendant. The uncontroverted 
evidence showed that Miss Hough was known as Robin Hough in each 
of the states in which the parties resided. Miss Hough admitted 
that she always used her maiden name. T. Vol. I. p. 114-115, R. 
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1278-1279. As a matter of fact, plaintiff even filed this action 
in the name of Hough. R. 2-3. Without repeating the facts 
relating to plaintiff's continuous use of her maiden name, 
suffice it to say that the record is replete with testimony and 
evidence in that regard. T. Vol. I, p. 79-84, 112-114, 116-119, 
R. 1243-1248, 1276-1278, 1280-1283, Ex's 41-52, 57-69. See also, 
pages 3-5 of this Brief. 
It is undisputed that in each of the communities, the 
plaintiff was known exclusively as Robin Hough. At the trial she 
produced no charge cards, driver's licenses, bank accounts, 
social security cards or other such documents in the name of 
Robin Colley. In addition, as pointed out hereafter, when she. 
applied for a passport, she did so as Robin Hough, a woman who 
had never been married. The fact that Miss Hough continued to be 
known, throughout her association with defendant, as Miss Hough 
is strong evidence that there was no marriage. Gary v. Gary, 
supra. 
2. The competent evidence showed that the reputa-
tion of the parties in Montana was that of not being married. 
Chloe Roosma and Peggy Heinselman, two long-time residents of Hot 
Springs, Montana, testified by way of deposition. T. Vol. II, p. 
316, R. 1703. Their testimony conclusively established that the 
reputation of plaintiff and defendant in the town of Hot Springs, 
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Montana was that of not being married. Peggy Heinselmanr who 
knew plaintiff and defendant socially and who had attended "more 
than several" social affairs with themr Depo. Heinselman p. 14, 
testified that she had never heard Miss Hough introduced by Dr. 
Colley as his wife and that she had never heard either one of 
them say that they were married. Depo. Heinselman p. 7. She 
further testified that it was clear to her that the marital 
status of Miss Hough and Dr. Colley was that they were not 
married. Mrs. Heinselman stated that there were factions in the 
community that disagreed with the lifestyle of plaintiff and 
defendant and that by that she meant that they were living to-
gether and were not married. Depo. Heinselman p. 8. In answer 
to the question, "Can you tell me whether or not the reputation 
of Joel Colley and Robin Hough in the community of Hot Springs is 
one of being married or of not being married?" Mrs. Heinselman 
answered, "Not being married." Depo. Heinselman p. 6. Mrs. 
Heinselman further testified that in discussions with plaintiff, 
Miss Hough referred to Dr. Colley as "someone she was living 
with." Depo. Heinselman p. 12. 
Chloe Roosma who had lived in Hot Springs for 23 years 
when plaintiff and defendant came to town, testified that the 
reputation of the parties in the community of Hot Springs was 
that of not being married. Depo. Roosma p. 8. She testified 
that she had never heard plaintiff use the last name of Colleyf 
had never heard her introduce herself as Robin Colley or as Mrs. 
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Joel Colley and that she did not know off and had never heard of, 
anyone refer to Robin as Joel's wife or Joel as Robin's husband. 
Depo* Roosma p. 8-9. She further testified that the community 
did not approve of the lifestyle or the living arrangements bet-
ween plaintiff and defendant, and that their lifestyle was not 
satisfactory to the norms or standards of Hot Springs. Depo. 
Roosma p. 9-10. Miss Hough presented no contrary testimony. 
3. The passport application of plaintiff conclu-
sively shows that there was no common law marriage. In 1974, 
Miss Hough executed a passport application, wherein she stated, 
under oath, that she had never been married. Ex. 55. This is 
conclusive proof that plaintiff herself knew that the parties had 
never entered into a common law marriage and that her allegations 
to the contrary are recent fabrications generated solely for 
monetary gain. Plaintiff lamely attempted to explain the state-
ment away by contending that the parties had agreed to travel on 
separate passports, a contention vigorously disputed by defend-
ant. T. Vol. II, p. 107, R. 1271. There was, however, no evi-
dence introduced by Miss Hough to show that it was necessary for 
her to state that she had never been married in order to obtain 
her own passport. Thus, the sworn statement by plaintiff that 
she had never been married conclusively establishes that there 
had not been a marriage between plaintiff and defendant in Texas, 
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Pennsylvania or Montana. 
4. Plaintifffs conduct showed that there was no 
marriage. When Miss Hough and Dr. Colley visited her grandmother 
in Oklahoma, they were confronted by sobbing accusations that 
they were living in sin. T. Vol. IIf p. 109, R. 1499. Did Miss 
Hough deny those allegations or do anything to alleviate her 
grandmother's concerns? No! The parties tried to explain the 
situation to her and then left because they were causing her a 
great deal of hurt and pain. T. Vol. II, p. 110r R. 1500. Sure-
ly, if Miss Hough believed that she was married to Dr. Colley, 
she would have informed her own grandmother of that fact and thus 
avoided an unpleasant situation. The fact that she said nothing 
indicates that, as the court found, the parties had never 
married. 
5. Miss Hough herself admitted that she was not 
married to the defendant. Barbara K. Evans, defendant's cousin, 
testified that in 1976 she had a telephone conversation with the 
plaintiff wherein Miss Hough stated to her that she (Miss Hough) 
was considering getting married to Dr. Colley. Ms. Evans further 
testified that in the spring of 1981, she had another telephone 
conversation with Miss Hough wherein Miss Hough stated that she 
(Miss Hough) would like to have a baby but she did not want to 
Defendant's proffered, Ex. 74, was another passport 
application executed by plaintiff in 1980 wherein Miss Hough 
again stated, under oath, that she had never been married. 
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get married so that would be a stumbling block to having chil-
dren. T. Vol. II, p. 202-203, R. 1591-1592. In addition, Ms. 
Evans in response to the question, "Did Robin ever indicate to 
you in any fashion that she considered herself to be married to 
Dr. Colley?" Stated, "No." T. Vol. II, p. 205, R. 1594. 
6. Not only did the plaintiff fail to meet her 
burden of proof, the evidence clearly showed that there was no 
common law marriage between the parties. In the instant case, 
plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof. She produced no 
credible evidence relating to either an agreement of marriage or 
a reputation of marriage in any of the states in which the 
parties resided. Dr. Colley, on the other hand, presented 
voluminous evidence showing that the parties were not married. 
Thus, the trial court was clearly correct in its determination 
that no common law marriage occurred between the parties. As 
such, that finding must be upheld by this Court. The whole 
marriage issue could have been easily resolved by Miss Hough had 
she not declined Dr. Colley1s request that she marry him. T. 
Vol. II, p. 113-115, R. 1503-1505. To paraphrase the Court in 
Miller v. Sutherland, supra, "At any time over a period of (nine) 
years Miss Hough could have had the benefit of a ceremonial 
marriage had she desired it. She did not desire it, that was her 
decision." 
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H. Defendant was prevented, by the trial court, from 
presenting numerous items of competent evidence showing no common 
law marriage existed. Prior to the trial, the court ruled, 
defendant believes erroneously, that Dr. Colley could not present 
any evidence relating to matters that occurred in the state of 
Utah for the purpose of proving or disproving the existence of 
the common law marriage. R. 585-586. Although defendant 
9 
vigorously protested that ruling, the finding of the trial court 
that no common law marriage existed made that issue moot, as far 
as he is concerned on this appeal. If by some chance, however, 
this Court is inclined to overturn the factual finding of the 
trial court with relation to the common law marriage issue, the 
refusal by the trial court to accept defendant's evidence would 
then be material. 
At the time of trial, defendant proffered another pass-
port application executed by plaintiff in 1980 wherein plaintiff 
again stated, under oath, that she had never been married. Ex. 
74. Defendant further proffered several trust deeds, prepared 
under the direction of plaintiff, to Miss Robin Hough. Exs. 108 
& 109. The defendant also proffered the testimony of Mrs. Jane 
Wertz that the reputation of plaintiff and defendant in the 
Dr. Colley1s petition for an Interlocutory Appeal was 
denied. Supreme Court #20233. 
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neighborhood in Salt Lake City was that the plaintiff and 
defendant were living together but that they were not married. 
Defendant also, under the Court's ruling, proffered the testimony 
of Susan Chesteen, who had known both the plaintiff and the 
defendant since they moved to Salt Lake City. She stated that 
Miss Hough's reputation among the Medical Wives Auxiliary of the 
University of Utah was that of not being married to Dr. Colley, 
that, in fact, it was no secret that they were not married and 
that some of the wives in the Auxiliary were upset about Miss 
Hough being allowed into that organization. T. Vol. II, p. 222, 
R. 1611. 
The testimony of Mr. Robert Hixson was also proffered. 
He stated that he had a conversation with Miss Hough in the 
spring of 1981, wherein Miss Hough told him that she was not mar-
ried. T. Vol. II, p. 231, R. 1619. Mr. Ronald Radcliffe, by way 
of proffer, stated that he had had various conversations with 
Miss Hough wherein Miss Hough stated to him that she was not 
married and that at no time did she purport to be married to Dr. 
Colley. T. Vol. II, p. 249, R. 1637. In addition, defendant was 
instructed by the Court to make a written proffer of the testi-
mony he was precluded from presenting at the time of trial. T. 
Vol. II, p. 318, R. 1705. Defendant made such a proffer. R. 873 
- 878. The proffered testimony, if admitted, would have shown 
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that Miss Hough specifically represented herself to numerous 
people in Salt Lake City as not being married to Dr. Colley; that 
in January, 1982, she stated, on her employment questionnaire 
that she was not married and designated Dr. Colley as her 
"friend". Defendant's proffer also included Exhibits 69, 71, 72, 
73, 74, 105, 106, and 107. Those documents generally show that 
the plaintiff purchased airline tickets and traveled under the 
name of Robin Hough; that she was listed in the Salt Lake City 
Phone Directory from 1976 to 1981 as Robin Hough; that she 
registered at various motels as Robin Hough; rented a car as 
Robin Hough; maintained bank accounts in the name of Robin Hough; 
purchased various items under the name of Robin Hough; purchased 
real property under the name of "Robin Hough, an unmarried 
woman;" had a Utah driver's license under the name of Robin Hough 
and generally conducted business and entered into transactions in 
Utah exclusively under the name of Robin Hough. 
In addition, defendant was prohibited from presenting 
any evidence relating to his marriage to his present wife. T. 
Vol. II, p. 179, 258-259, R. 1569, 1646-1647. That testimony 
would have been particularly significant since the law recognizes 
a presumption that a ceremonial marriage is valid and thus, 
plaintiff would have had the burden of overcoming not only the 
presumption against the change in status of a meretricious 
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relationship, but also the presumption that Dr. Colley's 
ceremonial marriage in 1982 to his present wifef Donna, was 
valid. Muillinax v. Muillinax, 447 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1969); Baker v. Lee, 337 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1960); Martin v. 
Martin, 29 Utah 2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973); Shepard & Pierson 
Co. v. Baker, 262 P. 887 (Mont. 1927). 
I. Plaintiff's contention that Ex. 117 should have been 
admitted is erroneous. Plaintiff argues that Ex. 117 should have 
been admitted by the Court. Plaintiff cleverly attaches a photo 
copy of that exhibit to her brief so that the contents of the 
exhibit will not go unnoticed by this Court. Defendant submits, 
however, that the ruling of the trial court was correct. Prior 
to attempting to admit the exhibit the plaintiff stated that she 
had kept a file of newspaper articles because she felt that the 
newspaper had committed libel and slander. T. Vol. I, p. 214, R. 
1603. The court correctly perceived that it would be inconsis-
tent for Miss Hough to contend on one hand that the newspaper had 
been guilty of libel and slander, and on the other to admit the 
newspaper article in support of her contention of a common law 
marriage. Beyond that, however, the newspaper article was not 
authenticated by anyone. If admitted, defendant would have had 
no opportunity to cross examine anyone concerning it. Certainly, 
it would be important to know upon what information its author, 
Lenore Brown, made the statements that she apparently made. Was 
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the newspaper article an "in" joke amongst the residents of Hot 
Springs? Was the newspaper actually published and distributed? 
If so, to whom? Plaintiff's argument that the article should 
have been admitted pursuant to Rule 803 (19) of Utah Rules of 
Evidence is most curious since Miss Hough successfully blocked 
much of the direct testimony of Ms. Evans, relating to the 
reputation of the plaintiff and defendant among the members of 
Dr. Colley's family, by contending that the exception provided by 
that Rule did not apply. The article is inadequate, however, for 
the purpose of fitting within the exception of that Rule. Plain-
tiff's claim that the article is a "business record" is absurd. 
Even it if were, however, there must be someone to lay the proper 
foundation for that exception to the hearsay rule. Plaintiff 
produced no one. The last claim by plaintiff is that the docu-
ment was admissible under Rule 803 (24). Suffice it to say that 
plaintiff presented none of the arguments that she makes to this 
Court at the time that the document was refused. In addition, 
the plaintiff failed to make the existence of the document known 
to the defendant in advance of the trial and failed to provide 
the defendant with the fair opportunity to prepare to meet it 
that that Rule requires. Thus, its exclusion was clearly proper. 
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Ill 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A 
PARTNERSHIP IS WHOLLY LACKING 
As with the supposed marriage, Miss Hough conveniently 
ignores the specifics and apparently argues that a partnership 
between the parties must have occurred "somewhere." She does 
not, however, state precisely when or where the partnership was 
formed, nor does she identify the business of the partnership. 
A. Since there was no business for profit, there was no 
partnership. The record is totally devoid of any evidence that 
the parties operated a business for profit in the state of Texas, 
where both were full time college students. At that time, Miss 
Hough was unemployed and her only income was an "allowance" from 
her parents. Since there was no business operated by the 
parties, by definition, there could be no partnership. 
Similarly, there is no testimony of any business for a 
profit conducted by the parties in either Pennsylvania, Montana, 
Arkansas or Colorado. Rather, the evidence showed that Miss 
Hough maintained separate employment as an occupational therapist 
with her separate business accounts, while Dr. Colley was 
employed as a physician. Since a partnership is a business for a 
profit, it was incumbent upon Miss Hough to identify the 
partnership business conducted by the parties in the various 
For a discussion of the activities conducted in Utah 
see Appellant's Brief, p. 11-12. 
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states. This she totally failed to do. 
B
» The findings of the trial court are not supported by 
competent evidence. Plaintiff argues that the Findings of the 
trial court were based upon "a wealth of substantial and credible 
evidence." Rather than cite to any specifics in the record, how-
ever, plaintiff merely reiterates the Findings made by the court. 
The defendant acknowledges that such Findings were in fact made, 
however, the Findings are not supported by the record. For 
instance, where is there any evidence in the record that Miss 
Hough would devote all of her time and talents to the property 
and that Dr. Colley would contribute money but that both would 
share on an equal basis? Plaintiff cites none. Defendant has 
previously cited to the precise testimony of plaintiff which is 
at variance with this Finding by the trial court. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 14-16. 
C. Plaintiff's contention that there was an agreement 
between the parties requiring a distribution other than as pro-
vided by statute is not supported by the record. Miss Hough 
argues, for the first time on appeal, that she had an agreement 
with Dr. Colley that any distribution of proceeds from the 
partnership would be divided differently than is required by 
§48-1-15 and §48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated. Miss Hough again 
fails, however, to state precisely when and where such an 
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agreement took place. Was it in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, 
Arkansas, Colorado, or Utah? Plaintiff apparently relies upon 
her testimony that while the parties were in Montana they dis-
cussed that if anything happens "half is yours and half is mine," 
but she does not state what partnership business was purportedly 
being conducted in Montana. Miss Hough also testified that there 
were "similar conversations" in Denver and in Salt Lake City, but 
similarly fails to identify any partnership business. Even if 
the testimony of plaintiff is believed, however, merely agreeing 
that property should be divided one-half to each party is a long 
way from an agreement that the capital contributions of Dr. 
Colley would not be returned to him, and it is a guantum leap 
away from the assertion that the legitimate obligations incurred 
to finance the property would not be repaid out of "partnership" 
assets. In deed, an agreement to divide property on a 50-50 
basis is no more than is presumed by general partnership law. 
Zyck v. Hartford Ins. Group, 150 N.J. Super. 431, 375 A.2d 1232 
(1977); Presutti v. Presutti, 270 Md.193, 310 A.2d 791 (1973); 1^ 
S. Rowley on Partnerships §18.0 p. 447 (2d Ed. 1960). It cannot, 
therefore, constitute an agreement to distribute contrary to the 
statute as Miss Hough contends. 
Plaintiff incorrectly relies upon the case, Bridgeman v. 
Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 98 P. 186 (1908). That case held, among 
other things, that the existence of a partnership may be implied 
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under certain circumstances. Plaintiff apparently claims, on the 
one hand, that there was an implied partnership based upon the 
conduct of the parties. Resp. Br. p. 18. She also argues, 
however, that there was a specific agreement to distribute the 
property contrary to the statutes. It must be obvious that those 
positions are inconsistent with each other. If there was an 
implied partnership, there could not have been a specific 
distribution agreement as plaintiff contends. If there was a 
specific agreement of distribution, it does not make sense that 
none of the other terms of the "partnership" were ever spelled 
out. 
Miss Hough's reliance upon the testimony of Jean 
Lambert, Donald Heinig and Wirt Hines is also misplaced. The 
testimony of Mr. Heinig and Mr. Hines, taken in the light most 
favorable to Miss Hough, was that on two occasions Dr. Colley had 
indicated that whatever had been acquired by the parties would be 
divided "50-50." T. Vol. II, p. 56-57, 72. The testimony of 
June Ellen Thomas Lambert was even narrower in scope. Her 
testimony was that Dr. Colley had stated that in the event of a 
separation, the house would be divided equally. T. Vol. II, 
p.63. Defendant objected to the testimony since it did not 
relate to an actual agreement between the parties, but was merely 
an expression of what Dr. Colley, at that time, was willing to 
-56-
do. T. Vol. II, p. 56, R. 1446. The Court, however, allowed the 
testimony. T. Vol. II, p. 382, R. 1769. 
Nowhere did either the plaintiff, or any of her wit-
nesses, testify that there was a specific agreement between Dr. 
Colley and Miss Hough, that in the event of separation, Miss 
Hough would be entitled to half of the gross estate that had been 
acguired. Similarly, the record is totally devoid of any evi-
dence that Dr. Colley had agreed that he would be left with all 
of the debts and obligations of the "partnership" and that Miss 
Hough would get off scot free. That, however, is precisely the 
result of the trial court's erroneous ruling. 
D. The distribution of the assets of the relationship, 
ordered by the court, is grossly disproportionate and 
inequitable. There is no dispute that Dr. Colley borrowed money 
from his retirement trust and put it into the properties. Miss 
Hough's counsel freely admitted as such. T. Vol. Ill, p. 14-15. 
See also Ex. 94, R. 1114-1128. 
Miss Hough's contention that the trial court did not 
deny Dr. Colley reimbursement for the loans made to the partner-
ship is simply not true. The trial court originally found that 
any mortgages signed by both parties, and the liabilities 
thereon, would be recognized. R. 1080. The trial court also 
ordered that obligations owed to third-parties would be paid and 
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that the remaining net proceeds would be divided between the 
parties. R. 1083. 
Dr. Colley vigorously protested the refusal of the court 
to order the repayment of all of the money borrowed from the 
retirement trust, but felt some consolation in the decision of 
the trial court that the liabilities relating to mortgages 
executed by both of the parties would be paid. The trial court, 
however, subsequently changed its mind and now has ordered that 
the subject mortgages will be paid, only to the extent that there 
is any equity in the properties. R. approx. 1865-1867. Dr. 
Colley contends that this further compounds the error made by the 
court, since all debts of the "partnership" must be repaid before 
any "partner" is entitled to any portion of the assets. 1 S. 
Rowley, supra, §40(b) p. 760. 
There is nothing in the record to justify the conclusion 
that the parties agreed to a distribution of the assets of the 
"partnership" other than as provided by statute. In deed, even 
if such an agreement existed, it could not extinguish the obliga-
tion of the "partnership" to repay %he funds borrowed from the 
profit sharing trust. There can be no doubt that rf there was a 
partnership between the parties, the funds borrowed by Dr. Colley 
from the profit sharing trust are an obligation of that partner-
ship. The funds were used in the acquisition or maintenance of 
the properties and plaintiff herself, prior to the commencement 
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of litigation, recognized those loans as an obligation of the 
parties. Ex. 28, a copy of which is included at A8 to All. Miss 
Hough now contends, however, that since she did not personally 
sign the Promissory Notes, she was not obligated to repay the 
debt. Such, however, is contrary to the law of this state. In 
Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901), 
this Court held that an obligation incurred by one partner may be 
enforced against the other partner. In that case, Andrews, a 
partner of Hawke, was obligated to repay money that had been 
borrowed by Hawke and used in their business even though the 
letter by which the money was borrowed was signed only by Hawke. 
This Court stated, 
In a trading partnership, a partner may enter into 
any contract or engagement for the firm in its 
ordinary trade or business, and may buy, sell, or 
pledge goods, borrow money, or do any other acts 
incident or appropriate to such business according 
to the ordinary course or usage thereof. 
This Court further stated, 
When • • . money is borrowed by one member of a 
firm on the credit of the firm, according to the 
usual course of business, within the general scope 
of its authority, the partnership is liable 
therefore. 
Finally this Court concluded, 
Nor, where a transaction of one partner is for the 
firm and within the general or apparent scope of 
the partnership business, is it a matter of any 
consequence that the writing evidencing the trans-
action is signed with the name of the individual 
partner only. 
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It is undisputed that Dr. Colley was the only person 
that could borrow from the retirement trust. T. Vol. IIy p. 306f 
R. 1693. Neither is it disputed that over $104,000 was borrowed 
and that those funds were used for the acquisition or maintenance 
of the properties in question. The Promissory Notes executed by 
Dr. Colley, Ex. 94, make specific reference to the individual 
parcels of property which were pledged as security for the 
obligations. There can be no question that, if there was a 
partnership, the funds were used in the usual course of its 
business. 
The fact that the properties may have declined in value 
can relate only to the issue of the security to satisfy the loan, 
but can not extinguish the debt. Thus, the refusal of the trial 
court to order the repayment of the entire obligation was clearly 
in error. In addition, the determination by the court that Dr. 
Colley, in some fashion, was obligated to indemnify Miss Hough 
for any obligations owed to the retirement trust that were not 
secured by a mortgage executed by both parties, has no basis in 
the law. See, R. 1105-1106. 
E. Selective application of partnership principals to 
unmarried co-habitants is improper. Miss Hough argues that Dr. 
If a partnership existed it must have been a trading 
partnership since Miss Hough makes five separate references 
in her brief to buying, selling or trading properties. 
Resp. Br. p. 11, 17, 18, 19, 40. 
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Dr. Colley has not attempted to identify the legal nature of the 
relationship between the parties. Apparently, plaintiff failed 
to read pages 31-40 of Appellant's Brief. The problem in this 
case is that the trial court has attempted to deal with and 
adjudicate the rights of unmarried co-habitating parties by care-
fully selecting certain portions of the Partnership Act while 
ignoring others. Plaintiff has been more than willing to 
cooperate with the trial court in such a charade. Defendant 
suggests, however, that Miss Hough can not have it both ways. If 
there was a partnership, Miss Hough is responsible for one-half 
of the partnership debts and Dr. Colley must be reimbursed for 
his expenditures relating to the property. Section 48-1-15(2), 
U.C.A.; Meredith Development v. Bennett, 444 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App. 
1969). If there was no partnership, plaintiff is not entitled to 
any of the property since, prior to the commencement of the 
action, Miss Hough had guit-claimed any interest she had to Dr. 
Colley. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that a 
common law marriage existed between the parties. The evidence in 
this case clearly supports the findings of the trial court that 
there was no such marriage. There is no competent evidence in 
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the record to support the finding of the trial court that the 
defendant was to assume the entire financial obligation relating 
to the relationship between the parties. The trial court's re-
fusal to repay the money that was borrowed to acquire the proper-
ties and to pay the other funds that were personally provided by 
Dr. Colley to maintain the properties after Miss Hough walked 
out, is clearly error. As the situation now stands, the obliga-
tions of the "partnership" remain unpaid, Miss Hough has received 
half of the gross assets of the "partnership" but has incurred 
none of the liabilities. Dr. Colley, on the other hand, has been 
saddled with all of the liabilities and has been forced to "bite 
the bullet" on all of the money that he advanced to maintain the 
properties after Miss Hough left. Even under plaintiff's theory 
of the case, one would be hard pressed to say that the assets of 
the "partnership" have been divided equally between the parties. 
The findings and judgment of the trial court relating to 
the marriage issue should be sustained, but the distribution of 
the assets under a claim of partnership must be reversed. 
DATED this day of August, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. THOMAS BOWEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Colo.) TAYLOU v. TAVLOIi. 1049 
sustained, the abandonment must be shown 
by a preponderance of proof. Especially 
should this rule be Invoked and strictly en-
forced In a case like that at bar, where it 
is claimed parties had abandoned a water 
right shown to be of great value, after 20 
years' user of It, and immediately after a 
solemn decree of court confirming their ti-
\ tie to it. No necessity exists for a review in 
j detail of the evidence presented, and such a 
?
 course would extend this opinion beyond any 
\ reasonable limits. It is sufficient to say that 
the evidence wholly falls to show, by a pru-
! pendent uce of proof, the existence of any 
\ one element necessary to constitute abaudon-
\ nient. That which tends to substantiate it, 
I as plaintiffs claim, is too vague, indefinite, 
\ and uncertain. Intention, for instance, Is 
I the very essence of abandonment, and the 
\ latent of defendants to abandon is not shown 
jl to have existed at any time. The mere fact, 
I conclusively shown and really not disputed, 
I Unit during each year, from IKS2 to ltfUO, the 
I lauds lying under the Lincoln ditch were 
I cultivated, and produced a crop by the use 
j of water from the Big Fountain, transport-
I ed through the ditch In question, conclusively 
I allowN that there was no abandonment, and 
| outweighs all of the evidence of plaintIftV 
I witnesses based upon their surmises and 
I opinions. This cannot !>o controverted by 
| the mere opinions of witnesses that, If more 
I water had been used, better ami larger crops 
I could have been raised. The mere fact that 
I pin-lies cultivating lands under the Lincoln 
! diteh did not see lit, in a time of scarcity, to 
| shut down their uclghl>ors' ditches, and seek 
I to enforce their right to all of the water 
i awarded to them, cannot be held to raise a 
I presumption that they Intended to abandon 
I tliilr rights under the decree in whole or In 
1 (tftrt. Where a question of abandonment is 
| Involved, If presumptions are to be indulged 
| In, they will be against the party asserting 
k It. The findings were In accord with the 
I proofs, and, perceiving no error, the Judg-
I meat will be afiirmed. Aliirmed. 
I TAYLOIt v. TAYLOR. 
* (Court of Appeals of Colorado. Nov. 8, 1807.) 
I COMMON-LAW MAKUMOK—KVIOKNOS. 
* A common-in w uiiirrintfc \H not shown by n> 
M regular cohabitation and partial reputation. 
i Error to district court, Ijike county. 
J Action by Pnrneey Taylor against George 
I I Taylor. Judgment for defendant. Plain-
|(Iff brings error. Affirmed. 
f k. J. Sterling and A. S. Blake, for plaintiff 
J a error. Charles Cavender and John A. 
fEwing, for defendant in error. 
i WILSON, J. This was an action for dl-
Moree and alimony, instituted by the plain-
J -ff in error. It is ad mi l ted that no marriage 
!tfeuiuuy was performed, and that there 
i 
[ was no compliance had or attempted with 
I lie statutory provisions as to the solemniza-
tion of marriage. It was alleged iu the com-
plaint, and attempted to be shown, that a 
marriage was created by a verbal agree-
ment of the parties, followed bjr cohabita-
tion for a period of about four years, ami 
general repute. All material allegations 
were denied by a verified answer. The is-
sues were found in favor of the defendant, 
and judgment rendered dismissing the bill. 
This case was before this court heretofore, 
on an application for alimony pendente lite, 
and in the course of its opinion denying the 
application the court said: "We are un-
able to discover errors which leave the im-
pression that they are of suilicieut impor-
tance to compel a reversal of the judgment, 
unless we accept counsel's proposition that 
the Judgment is not supported by the evi-
dence." Taylor v. Taylor, 7 Colo. A pp. 541), 
-1-J l'ac. <>7f>. We still adhere to the same 
views, ami hence the only question to be 
now considered is whether there was suttt-
clent evidence to support the judgment. 
Ily the statutes of Colorado, marriage is de-
clared to be a civil contract; and there 1st 
only oue essential requirement to Its validity, 
between parties capable of contracting, viz. 
the consent of the parties. There are cer-
tain statutory provisions as to IUVII.NO, eer-
tiilcates, record, ami authority to perform 
the marriage ceremony, etc.; but uowheie is 
a marriage declared to be void because it 
was uot contracted in accordance with these 
provisions, or was contracted lu violation of 
them. It follows, therefore, that a marriage 
contract, between parties of contracting ca-
pacity, which possesses the one esseutial 
prerequisite, may be valid, although no pro-
vision of the statute as to its solemnization 
may have been followed, or attempted to-
have been followed. In other words, in this 
state a marriage simply by agreement of the 
parties, followed by cohabitation as hushaiut 
and wife, und such other attendant circum-
stances as are necessary to constitute what 
Is termed a "common-law marriage," may-
be valid and binding. Does the evidence in 
tliis case show that such a marriage was 
contracted between the parties'/ The great 
weight of authority Is that the contract alone 
is not suilicieut, unless it is followed by Its 
consummation; that is, by cohabitation as 
husband and wife. It is also agreed that In 
cases where the contract or agreemeut is 
denied, and cannot be shown, its existence 
may be proven by, and presumed from, evi-
dence of cohabitation as husband and wife, 
and general repute. "Cohabitation," as 
here used, means something more than sex-
ual intercourse. Bouvier defines "cohabit" 
to be "to live together iu I he same house, 
claiming to be married." Webster define* 
"cohabitation" as "the act or state of dwell-
ing together, or in the same place with an-
other." "It is not a sojourn, uor a habit of visit-
ing, nor even a remaining with for a time. 
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None of those fall wlthiu the true idea of co-
habitation as a fact presumptive of mar-
riage. • • * To cohabit is to live or dwell 
together, to have the same habitation; so 
that, where one lives and dwells, there does 
the other live and dwell with him." Yard-
ley's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 211. tty "general 
reputation or repute" Is meant the under* 
standing among the neighbors and nc<|uuiul-
auees with whom the parties associate in 
their daily life that they are living together 
as husband and wife, and not in meretri-
cious Intercourse. "In its application to the 
fact of marriage, it is more than mere hear-
say. It Involves, and is made up of, social 
conduct and recognition, giving character to 
an admitted and unconcealed cohabitation." 
Kadger v. Badger, 8S N. Y. 55b\ It is nec-
essary that there be evidence both of cohab-
itation and reputation before such a mar-
riage can be presumed. Proof of one alone 
is not sullicicut to sustain the prcsumptiou. 
Com. v. Stump, 53 Pa. &t. Kill. As was said 
In the Yurdley's Estate Case, above cited: 
"The Scotch expression conveys the true 
idea, perhaps better than our own,—tin* 'hab-
it aim! repute* of marriage. Thus, when wo 
see a man and woman constantly living to-
gelher,—where one Is dwelling, there the oth-
er constantly dwells with him,—-we obtain 
the ilrst idea or tirst step in the prcsump-
tiou of marriage; and when we add to tills 
that the parties so constantly living together 
are reputed to be man and wife, ami so tak-
en ami received by all who know them both, 
we take the second thought or second step 
in the presumption of the fact of a marriage. 
Marriage Is Lite cause; these follow as the ef-
f e c t When the full thought contained in 
these words, 'cohabitation' and 'reputation 
of marriage,' is embraced, w e discover that 
an inconstant habitation and a divided repu-
tation of marriage carry with them no full 
belief of an antecedent marriage as the 
cause. The irregularity in these elements 
of evidence Is at once a reason to think there 
Is Irregularity in the life itself the parties 
lead, unless attended by independent facts 
which aid in the proof of a marriage. With-
out concomitant facts to prove marriage, 
such an irregular cohabllatlou ami partial 
reputation of marriage avail nothing In the 
proof of marriage." Apply lug these rules 
to the evidence in this cast*, which we have 
fully and carefully examined, we have no 
hesitancy In saying that It is amply sufficient 
to support the findings and judgment of the 
trial court. Not only this, but the proof 
failed to sustain the allegations of plaintliT, 
ami any other tindlug and Judgment would 
have been against the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The testimony 
cannot be read without creating the convic-
tion that no marriage was ever contemplat-
ed, and that the relations between the par-
tics were wholly meretricious. If the facts 
presented a case in which there was the 
slightest reason to believe that youth and in-
experience had been Imposed upon and de-
ceived, the court would feel impelled by ev-
ery dictate of right and justice, as well as 
by the settled rules ami principles of law, to 
shield and protect innocence, so far as with-
in its power, by indulging in every possible 
j presumption'in its favor. This is far from 
being such a case, however. At the time 
when the pretended contract was made, aud 
the connection with defendant begun, plain-
tiff was 38 years of age; had been twice 
married, and as many times divorced; had 
been an actress for 1!0 years, ami traveled 
much; and. according to her own testimony, 
had previously had a wide ami varied expe-
rience, aside from that mairintouiai. The 
judgment is aliirmed. Atiirnied. 
BREVOOUT • . HUGHES. 
(Court of Appeals of Colorado. Nov. 8, 1807.) 
l i n . i . s i \ i > N » » T I : M - - 1 ' , A I I . I HI; OV C O N S U M M A T I O N — 
KVIIIKNOU —CoNTKNTS lUf Luhl' l.N-
s rue MI. NT. 
1. Where a uote was given in fulfillment of 
a subscription in aid of u street railway, the fact 
that the company did nut fulfill all of tlie obliga-
tions contained in I lie mib*criptiou agreement 
shows hut u partial failure of consideration, uud 
is iusutlieieui to supuort a judgment for defend-
ant. 
2. The existence of the original subscription 
agreement having been shown by testimony of 
the persona in whose custody it was, further tes-
timony that he had loat the paper, aud that he 
had made search for it in such places as it was 
likely to be without success, is suilleieut to justi-
fy the admission of secondary evidence as to its 
contents. 
Appeal from district court, Arapahoe coun-
ty. 
Action by W. H. Brevoort against Thomas 
P. Hughes. There was judgment fur de-
fendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed. 
H. C. Van Seha&ck, for appellant. 
WILSON, I. Defendant, Hughes, subscrib-
ed $r><H> to aid in the construction of au elec-
tric railway from the business portion of the 
city of Denver, along Eighth street, to the 
town of Mouteluir. The original subscrip-
tion agreement was In writiug, and was sign-
ed by the defendant. In furtherance of his 
j subscription, he executed three several prtuu-
issory notes, each for the sum of $U>o\uu\ 
payable to Charles A. Haymoud, treasurer of 
l the proposed company. These notes were, 
j after maturity, assigned to plaintiff, who In-
j stltuted this suit to recover judgment on 
I them. The answer admitted the execution 
of the notes, aud alleged the consideration to 
have been the promise aud ngreemeul that 
the railway company would build, construct, 
and operate a street-railway line from the 
principal business portion of the city of Den* 
ver to Monteluir, along and upon Eighth ave-
nue; that it would run and operate luisseiuu-r 
cars, prof i l ed by electricity, upon and along 
suid railway line, and would carry therein pas-
sengers to and fro for reasonable hire; that 
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Certified Public Accountants 
466 East 5th South • Suite 200 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / (801) 521-7620 
Joel E. Colley & Robin L. Hough 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
The accompanying statements of assets and liabilities of Joel E. Colley 
& Robin L. Hough as of December 31, 1980, have been compiled by us, 
A compilation is limited to presenting in the form of financial state-
ments information that is the representation of owners. We have not 
audited or reviewed the accompanying statements of assets and liabilities 
and, accordingly, do not express an opinion or any other form of assur-
ance on them. 
9Ca^ t^ Ly 7^W2w^ -V fljj&vio^ 
Karren, Hendrix & Associates 
May 1, 1981 
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& JOEL E. COLLEY & ROBIN L. HOUGH 
STATEMENT OF ASSETS & LIABILITIES 
DECEMBER 31, 1980 
? 
ASSETS 
Cash 
Jewelry & precious metals 
Home furnishings 
Automobile 
Boat 
Trailer 
Corporate stock (see footnote \\1) 
Partnership interests (see footnote #3) 
Real estate - personal residence 
Real estate - other (see footnote #4) 
LIABILITIES 
Miscellaneous personal liabilities 
Loans payable (see footnote #5) 
Mortgages payable (see footnote #6) 
EXCESS OF ASSETS OVER LIABILITIES 
COST 
BASIS 
30,000 
12,500 
55,000 
10,500 
14,350 
3,000 
13,000 
126,250 
125,000 
420,000 
809,600 
537,330 
$ 272^2211 
ESTIMATED 
VALUE 
BASIS 
} 30,000 
/*»£</ 
/rrts 
20,000 PtU.a-.*; 
50,000 ,or<xrj 
7,000 
13,000 
2,000 
-a 
HZO^ 
P^Cno k*1 
101,870 £o,ovt 
4f57000<?v>~i7J 
-200,4)00 itqetrO 
603,000 ptg.firm 
1.199,870 ^Qr^ 
200 
17,400 
19,730 
200 
17,400 
519,730 
/ oro 
1 -?CrtJ 
zm*n< 
537,330 3 2 ^ ? 
$ 662.540 <%/>/£ 
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See accountants' compilation report attached. 
^JOEL E. COLLEY & ROBIN L. HOUGH" 
NOTES TO STATEMENT OF ASSETS & LIABILITIES 
DECEMBER 31, 1980 
1. ESTIMATED VALUES 
All estimated values were determined by Joel E. Colley and Robin L. Hough. 
2. CORPORATE STOCK 
Corporate stock includes 100% of the stock of Joel E. Colley, M.D., A 
Professional Corporation. Cost of the stock was $1,000.00. The current 
net worth of the corporation is $86,870. Other stock holdings are 
common stocks in various corporations with a cost of approximately $12,000 
and an estimated value of $15,000. 
bokttJ^J 
3. PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
PARTNERSHIP 
Can-Am Drilling ... / 
Arlington Park Associates 
Bend Arch 80-A 
Integrated Cattle Systems I 
McCormick Oil & Gas Co. 
Apache Oil & Gas - <i>-t»£>»*-« 
Shasta Mining 
fcrtrrf f V»»> s uoi ft^Wt-t. £>»*«., eA. 
4. REAL ESTATE - OTHER 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
Rental Properties (income producing) 
1550 South 4th East, S.L.C., Utah 
520 9th Ave. , S.L.C, Utah 
514 Wilson, S.L.C, Utah 
1358 Roberta, S.L.C, Utah 
231 Browning Ave., S.L.C, Utah 
382 Leslie, S.L.C, Utah 
Hot Springs, Montana 
Investment Properties 
Flathead, Montana 
Spring Creek, Park City, Utah 
Duplex lot, Park City, Utah 
TOTAL 
COST BASIS 
$ 15,000 . 
57,500 
15,000 
5,000 
12,500 
6,250 
15,000 
$126,250 
COST BASIS 
51,305 
42,110 
39,405 
36,643 
43,145 
43,609 
12,153 
25,000 
47,000 
ESTIMATED 
CURRENT VALUE 
$ 5,000 
58,000 
60,000 
5,000 
12,000 
3,000 
30,000 
siLLm 
ESTIMATED 
CURRENT VALUES 
f<V2*/ 
<?3: 
^•a^sY: 
3i5T 
C02 
?&3 (1) 
- O-
<£>7 etre, 
I ,Z96 
<f£2£P 
$ 65,000 s-^c' "Wgxv.?, 
70,000 d/7 firf- ***, 
48,000 "7/gv h>Pr- 35, 
48,000 SjzZL 0 / ^ \ : C' £ 
48,000 f/Sf *P/»«- ~&,i 
48,000 i'vh^ <-ti,° 
15,000 -tec c*i. 2,6 
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120,000 -£,, C V C^<! 
56,000 <?*£,.<. &*. -g> 
85,000 ^ ^ . . ^ 
$603.000 
JOEL E. COLLEY & ROBIN L. HOUGH 
NOTES TO STATEMENT OF ASSETS & LIABILITIES 
DECEMBER 31, 1980 
PAGE 2 
' ^ 
5. LOANS PAYABLE 
Loans are payable to various organizations and Individuals as follows: 
SECURITY 
Boat 
Car 
None 
None 
None 
TOTAL 
6. MORTGAGES PAYABLE 
PAYMENT 
MONTHLY 
$263 
223 
38 
ANNUAL 
$1,768 
667 
INTEREST 
RATE 
11% 
12% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
BALANCE 
DUE 
$-5T«00 
-£T600 
2^800 
1-.500 
1,700 
$1.7^ 400 
MATURITY 
DATE 
1983 
1983 
1982 
1983 
1986 
Mortgages are payable to various financial institutions, the Joel E. Colley, 
M.D., P.C. Retirement Trust, and various individuals 
SECURITY 
Personal residence 
Personal residence 
1550 South 4th East 
520 9th Ave. 
514 Wilson 
1358 Roberta 
231 Browning 
382 Leslie Ave. 
Hot Springs 
Flathead 
Spring Creek' 
Park. City 
MONTHLY 
PAYMENT 
919 
272 
413 
324 
348 
320 
329 
383 
-0-
720 
420 
-0-
INTEREST 
RATE 
10 1/2% 
10 1/2% 
10% 
11% 
10 1/2% 
6 3/4% 
10 1/2% 
10 1/2% 
9% 
9% 
13% 
13% 
BALANCE 
DUE 
$ 91,000 
15,000 
42-jeeo— 
31,900 
36,000 
33x990 
32,000 
40,000 
2^^ 600 <-0-
57,700 
49,500 V 
^ T O O O -&-
MATURITY 
DATE 
2007 
1988 
*1984 
2009 
*1985 
2006 
2006 
2008 
- 9/81 
*1986 
*1985 
6/1/82 
-
£2^--
l i w S I 
-4?-
•2,1, H3>(* 
•2M, "Sav 
-£~ 
39 yro 
- & • 
H 1, *>o~S 
(I 
- & • -
465,100 
Due Joel E. Colley M.D., P.C. Retirement 
Trust, secured by 2nd mortgages on above 
properties with interest payable annually 
at 12% to 15%, and with the principal 
balances payable in single balloon pay-
ments, the first of which being due in 
February, 1981, and the last in December, 
1984 
gzcpsK 
_5j4v630 
$519.730 
f<i T, ZW' 
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